This paper surveys state-mandated programs designed to provide natural catastrophe insurance to property owners and businesses unable to find a policy in the private market. The paper provides an overview of the 10 state programs offering wind or earthquake coverage and outlines the motivation for establishing such programs. The implications of design and operation decisions, such as pricing strategies and contract options, are discussed, as well as how these programs interact with the private property insurance market. Finally, the paper examines whether such programs can handle a truly catastrophic loss year and the merits and drawbacks of federal support for the programs.
Introduction
States play a prominent role in the management of natural disaster risk. They manage exposure levels through building codes, land-use regulations, and mitigation programs. States are involved, along with the federal government, in crisis response and in postdisaster rebuilding. State insurance commissioners, working with state legislatures, authorize private companies to sell insurance, oversee and approve insurance premiums, and regulate many other aspects of the private insurance market. In addition, some states that face catastrophic natural disaster risks have established state-mandated catastrophe insurance programs. The specifics of these programs vary, but all have some similar features and face similar challenges.
Most state programs were established following a disaster that raised concerns about the ability of private insurance companies to cover catastrophic risks and the affordability of such policies when they do. Broadly referred to as residual market mechanisms, they were created to provide insurance coverage to property owners and businesses unable to find a policy in the voluntary market. This paper focuses on the Gulf Coast states' and the Carolinas' programs designed to cover wind damage from hurricanes (Hawaii's program is now dormant) and California's program to cover earthquake losses. Though also potentially catastrophic, floods are insured at the federal level through the National Flood Insurance Program and are thus not covered by state programs.
The hurricanes of 2004, 2005, and 2008 focused attention on the management of natural catastrophe risk and raised questions about the design and functioning of state catastrophe insurance programs. This paper begins with a brief discussion of the nature of natural catastrophe risk that makes it difficult to insure. The paper then provides an overview of the residual market mechanisms, offering a brief description of the 10 state programs. The paper then moves on to * Fellow, Resources for the Future. I would like to thank without implicating the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: Dennis Burke, Smitty Harrison, Jan Mares, and Paul Raschky. I would also like to thank John Wortman, James Murphy, Mike Valdez, Joe Shumaker, Ron Cassesso, and Robert Groves for providing information on the programs. Remaining errors are, of course, my own. address a range of issues related to these programs, including the need for them, pricing strategies and subsidies, the types of insurance contracts offered, how such programs interact with the private market, whether they are designed to handle a catastrophic loss year, and the arguments for and against federal support to cover high-loss years.
The Nature of Natural Catastrophe Risk
Catastrophic risks are typically characterized by two features: "fat tails" and correlated losses. Many natural catastrophes, from earthquakes to wildfires, have been shown to be fattailed (e.g., Schoenberg et al. 2003; Newman 2005 ). An imprecise though popular term, this roughly means that the probability of an event declines slowly relative to its severity.
1 Thus, the most extreme event observed to date could be several times greater than the second most extreme event, which could be several times greater than the third, and so on. Take hurricanes. The most costly U.S. hurricane was Katrina (2005) , which caused more than $100 billion in damage, or close to three times the damage caused by the second costliest, Hurricane Andrew (1992), which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates cost "only" $35.5
billion. The next hurricane larger than Katrina could cause multiple times more damage.
Historical averages tend to underestimate potential losses from fat-tailed catastrophes.
Catastrophic risks are also correlated in space; that is, a large number of buildings in close proximity are affected simultaneously. As the size of an event increases, the number of buildings affected in the area increases as well. Unlike, say, theft, where the victimization of one person does not mean that a neighbor is also victimized, with correlated risks, large regions all sustain damage together. Further, building types in close geographic proximity are often similar, further correlating damages.
Both of these features of catastrophic risks-fat tails and correlated losses-make them difficult to insure, since they imply a larger risk of insolvency for the insurer. With noncatastrophic risks, premiums received in a given year can largely cover losses experienced in that year. Not so with catastrophes. For catastrophic risks, insurers must solve an intertemporal smoothing problem-matching regular premium payments, insufficient in any given year to cover a large loss, with the need for enormous sums of capital in a catastrophic year (Jaffee and Russell 1997) . Insurance companies generally manage their risk by ensuring enough access to 1 "Fat-tailed" often refers to data that can be well approximated by a power law or Pareto distribution.
capital so that the probability of going insolvent in a catastrophic year stays below a target level.
2
When losses are catastrophic, insurance companies must charge more to build up reserves, purchase reinsurance, or use the financial markets to meet their solvency target.
Simply put, premiums for catastrophic risks must be higher than for noncatastrophic risks. In good years, the rates may seem excessive to homeowners and policymakers unfamiliar with the intertemporal smoothing problem. The high rates are needed, though, to make up for the bad years. Two points are of note here. First, if private insurance companies do not believe they can write catastrophe insurance policies at a price that regulators will allow, it creates a need for and can put a strain on residual market mechanisms. Thus, there is an important interaction between pricing regulation of the voluntary market and the demand for policies in the residual market.
Second, state programs will face the same difficulties in smoothing losses over time as a private insurance company. They have a few more policy options to help in this endeavor, but they are not immune to the nature of catastrophic risks.
Overview of State Programs
Residual market mechanisms are designed to offer insurance to homeowners unable to obtain policies in the voluntary market. These programs take a variety of forms, including state Although their details differ, these programs share some common features. The majority of those offering wind-only coverage do so in defined high-risk areas, such as coastal counties.
California offers earthquake coverage everywhere in the state. Many programs have eligibility requirements intended to ensure that policies are purchased only as a last resort. All programs first cover losses out of premium and investment income. To cover higher amounts of claims, programs differ in the extent to which they rely on bonding or reinsurance, but all assess private insurers or their policyholders after an event that exceeds claims-paying capacity. In most cases, the state is not responsible for any losses the program may sustain, although recently several have appropriated general revenues to reduce deficits. The structure, size, and financing mechanisms for each state program are briefly reviewed here, and then the following sections discuss the implications of various design and operation decisions.
North Carolina
North Carolina has a FAIR program and a wind pool, the North Carolina Insurance 
South Carolina
South Carolina has no FAIR plan. Its wind pool, the South Carolina Wind and Hail Underwriting Association (SCWHUA) was established in 1971 to write wind and hail policies in coastal areas. Policies are only for residents unable to find wind coverage in the private market.
Policyholders receive premium credits for fortified homes certified by the Institute for Business and Home Safety. To obtain replacement cost coverage on primary dwellings, flood insurance is required. In 2007, the program expanded the areas in which coverage was available in response to growing concern about the cost and availability of private insurance (and also concern about the equity of the 1971 boundaries), but also raised rates 35 percent (Klein 2009 ). The SCWHUA can issue bonds and assess all property insurers in the state, based on their market share, to cover high loss years. Insurers may pass these assessments on to their policyholders. They may also reduce their assessment-even to zero-by voluntarily writing more wind coverage in the state's high-risk wind territory. The SCWHUA currently has reinsurance with a $10 million retention and coverage for losses greater than those estimated for a 1-in-150-year loss.
Georgia
Georgia has a FAIR plan, the Georgia Underwriting Association (GUA), but no state wind pool. The GUA, however, writes hail-and wind-only policies for homeowners and businesses in coastal counties and islands unable to find such coverage in the voluntary market, and as such, it is included here. New hurricane policies or increases in coverage are not allowed during a hurricane warning. To be eligible for coverage, buildings must comply with hurricane building codes. The GUA has purchased $150 million of reinsurance for losses over $50 million.
Should losses exceed available capital, it can assess all licensed insurance companies in the state in proportion to written premiums, but the companies are not allowed to pass the assessments on to policyholders. Should there be excess profits, member insurance companies receive a fraction. hurricanes led the state legislature to appropriate $715 million to lower the necessary assessments, and the rest of the deficit will be paid off over 10 years using emergency assessments (which were 2.5 percent in 2007 and around 1.5 percent in following years) (Klein 2008) .
Florida

Alabama
Alabama has a wind pool but no FAIR plan. The Alabama Insurance Underwriting 5 The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) is a tax-exempt state trust fund, established in 1993 following Hurricane Andrew, to provide mandatory reinsurance to property insurers in the state. It covers a fixed percentage (chosen by the insurer) of each participating insurer's losses that exceed a given retention level. Coverage is also subject to a maximum aggregate limit. The FHCF offers reinsurance at below-market rates based on the theory that it can build reserves tax free, does not have a risk load, has low administrative costs, and is a nonprofit. It is financed by premiums received, investment earnings, borrowing authority, and emergency assessments.
Every insurance company that writes property insurance in the state is a mandatory member of AIUA and thus eligible for assessments. Participation is determined by the percentage of business the insurer writes in coastal areas compared with its market share in the rest of the state. If an insurance company writes more polices in coastal areas than its share, it can bring its participation down to zero. The AIUA does not hold large reserves and purchases reinsurance with a significant portion of its revenues-60 percent in 2010 (Amy 2010a).
Assessments would cover the first $100 million in losses with the next $335 million covered by reinsurance. Losses in excess of reinsurance are also covered by assessments. As of 2008, the AIUA can also issue bonds to cover losses.
Mississippi
Mississippi has both a wind pool, the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association Hawaii legislature approved using HRF funds to end school furlough days (Tom 2010) .
California
The withdrawal of private companies from the property insurance market after the 1994
Northridge earthquake was extreme, and became a crisis California addressed by creating the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) in 1996. Insurance companies are mandated to offer minimum levels of earthquake coverage, which they can do on their own or through the CEA (for residential policies only; the CEA does not offer commercial coverage). 6 Upon joining CEA, insurers make a capital contribution and are able to be assessed after an event. Three requirements were imposed on the CEA: 70 percent of insurers in the state had to participate, it must be exempt from federal income taxes, and reinsurance be purchased at twice the level of contributions from insurance companies.
Participating insurers offer and service CEA policies, keeping a portion of premiums to cover their costs. Premiums vary by location and structural characteristics of the house and are required by law to be actuarially sound. They are set using sophisticated models of projected Decisions by private insurance companies to limit the number of policies they write for catastrophic lines stress residual market mechanisms as the population unable to find policies in the voluntary market grows. If the decrease in supply is temporary, state programs can be a useful stopgap. The insurance industry has been observed to cycle through "hard" and "soft" markets, periods when supply is low and expensive and then when it is readily available and cheaper. Major events, such as Andrew or Northridge, deplete capital, leading to a hard market (Cummins 2006 ). Hawaii's program exemplifies how the state can ensure availability in a hard market and then let the private sector step back in as the market softens. States can help 7 Part of State Farm's decision to withdraw was due to state-mandated mitigation credits that the company believed were not actuarially sound. Florida's mitigation credits have been a source of controversy, especially when fraud was uncovered in the program. For more information, see a report by the Florida Association of Insurance Agents (2009). encourage the return of the private market after hard periods by allowing insurers to charge rates that are risk-based and keeping residual market mechanisms as a place of last resort for property owners and businesses through higher prices and strict eligibility requirements (discussed below). South Carolina may be a case in point: rates in the state program were recently raised and private insurers seem to be returning or dropping plans to withdraw (Lehrer 2007 ).
This suggests that the role of state programs is to ensure the availability of coverage.
Proponents of state programs, however, contend they are needed to make insurance not just available but also "affordable." Although state programs may be able to offer slightly cheaper policies, especially since they do not attempt to charge all costs ex ante, ultimately, there is no free lunch. The costs must be paid by someone, and as discussed below, state programs make insurance "affordable" by passing some costs off on private insurance companies and other policyholders in the state. Economic theory suggests that the price of property insurance sends a signal to homeowners about the riskiness of a given location. When prices are too low because some of the costs are borne by others, homeowners will not fully internalize the costs of their decisions, theoretically leading to too much development in high-risk areas and too little mitigation. So the question is really whether and to what extent catastrophe insurance should be subsidized by others through a residual market mechanism, the cost of which may be inefficient development. Excess development, of course, only exacerbates the problem the program was trying to solve. Limiting exposure is a more permanent solution but may be more costly and is certainly politically untenable in many places.
Although "affordability" may explain political decisions to subsidize vocal, high-risk residents, there are two arguments for offering subsidized catastrophe insurance. The first is an equity argument: some low-income homeowners reside in high-hazard areas, and it is a government role to help these homeowners afford insurance, just as society subsidizes their food and health care. None of the state insurance programs, however, target low-income households or offer differentiated pricing based on income, suggesting this is not their reason-d'être. If this were the justification for state programs, a transparent, needs-based subsidy for private coverage could be designed and implemented instead. The difficulty is that while this will help lowincome residents, as said above, it could also encourage excess development.
The second argument is an economic one: insurance (particularly wind insurance, which banks usually require as a condition for a loan) is necessary for development, and some types of development must be in high-risk areas but provide economic spillovers that justify insurance subsidies. The extent to which this is the case is a difficult empirical question that to my knowledge has not been thoroughly addressed but would likely justify only very small and targeted subsidies in any event. States insurance programs do not seem to be motivated by this rationale, either, however, since they do not target specific development types and some exclude commercial development, which would be more likely to generate spillovers.
There may also be market imperfections that reduce the availability and raise the cost of catastrophe insurance, but other mechanisms besides state programs could be adopted to overcome these barriers. One market barrier is imperfect access to capital by insurance companies. Some authors have promoted the use of catastrophe bonds and other securities to help insurance companies access capital in the financial markets (e.g., Michel-Kerjan and Morlaye 2008). Another suggestion has been the creation of tax-deferred catastrophe reserves (Harrington and Niehaus 2001; Milidonis and Grace 2007) . Currently, insurance companies must keep catastrophe funds in general surplus accounts where they are taxed and may be depleted, and regulators may treat the extra funds as reason for more stringent price regulations (Klein and Wang 2007) . 8 If an insurer could allocate funds to a trust or separate account where they could accumulate tax free and be withdrawn only for payment of claims following predefined triggers, it could lower the cost of catastrophe insurance (Davidson 1998) . If either suggestion improved the functioning of the voluntary market significantly, it could reduce or eliminate the need for state programs. It appears unlikely, however, that such approaches would significantly increase supply, although they may still be desirable.
Pricing, Subsidies, and Incidence
Programs differ in their pricing goals. Some programs are designed to be true insurers of last resort, and as such, their prices are set higher than those in the voluntary market. For instance, Louisiana Citizens' prices must be greater than private rates. To further ensure they are markets of last resort, some state programs, such as in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Texas, require homeowners to demonstrate that they have been unable to find coverage in the private market (in Texas this requirement can be waived, but homeowners pay a surcharge). Of course, the requirements must be enforced. A recent audit of Louisiana Citizens found that 34 of 35 applications did not even disclose whether the eligibility requirement had been met (Associated Press 2010).
Other programs require that rates be actuarial. The Casualty Actuarial Society defines an actuarially sound rate as "reasonable, not excessive, not inadequate, and not unfairly discriminatory." This is the case when the rate is an estimate of the expected value of all future costs and when it accounts for all the costs associated with transferring the individual risk (Actuarial Standards Board 1999). For instance, TWIA adopts the language that rates must be reasonable, adequate, and not unfairly discriminatory. When setting rates, then, it must consider potential losses, operating expenses, and profit and contingency margins. Of course, many state programs can have "actuarial" rates that are lower than in the private sector because they are not seeking a profit, have lower expenses, and importantly, do not charge all costs in advance, instead relying on debt issuances that can be repaid through industry assessments. This may explain why TWIA, among others, couples actuarial requirements for rates with eligibility requirements.
Florida is one program that has more actively competed with the private market.
Originally, the program required rates to be high enough to not compete with the voluntary market. In 2007, this requirement was abandoned and Citizens' rates just had to be actuarially sound (GAO 2007) . Rates were also decreased and frozen until 2009. In 2007, the legislature also allowed homeowners to purchase a policy from Citizens, even if they were not denied coverage in the voluntary market, if a comparable policy cost more than 15 percent more than a Citizens policy. 9 Recently, concern has been building about Citizens' financial stability, and a task force on returning Citizens to being an insurer of last resort recommended, among other things, a "glide path" to increased rates (Citizens Property Insurance Corporation Mission Task In 2008, available coverage limits were increased to $2 million from $1 million, properties within 2,500 feet of the coast were exempted from complying with building codes, and further rate adjustments were postponed until 2010. These actions all had the effect of increasing Citizens' exposure. 10 As in many other states, such as Louisiana, the insurance commissioner approves rates in the residual market mechanism.
would need to increase almost 47 percent to be actuarially sound (Florida Catastrophic Storm Risk Management Center 2009). The authors found that at the 10 percent rate increase limit, and assuming a 3 percent inflation rate, some of the highest-subsided areas would not reach sound rates for years. For example, Hernando County rates would not be sound until 2034, and MiamiDade's would not be sound until 2019.
Depending on how geographically differentiated rates are in a program, cross-subsidies from lower-risk to higher-risk homeowners could be built into the pricing. For instance, the CEA decided to average rates over only 19 rating zones, even though it could have had finer pricing differences, leading to compression in the rates homeowners face. This, however, opens the possibility that private insurance companies could undermine the program and "cherry-pick" lower-risk customers facing higher average rates (Jaffee and Russell 2000) . Louisiana Citizens recently shifted to charging rates by zip code instead of parish, leading to finer-grained, and thus more risk-based, pricing. Many programs, such as Florida Citizens and the MWUA, also differentiate rates based on the property's structural characteristics, ensuring that pricing is closer to the actual risk.
Some of the largest cross-subsidies to policyholders in residual market mechanisms, however, arise from postevent assessments. Most states allow for assessments on all property companies or property insurance policies in a state, creating a cross-subsidy from policyholders outside the program to those within it. Lower-risk policyholders are thus underwriting some of the costs of higher-risk policyholders in the state program. A cross-subsidy from all general taxpayers in the state to policyholders in the residual market mechanisms can also occur when states give tax credits to companies to cover their assessments, as in Florida and Louisiana, or when states appropriate general funds to the insurance program, as has been done by Mississippi and Florida. Again, simple economic theory suggests that this will lead to inefficiently high levels of development in high-risk areas and inefficiently low levels of mitigation, since policyholders in the state pool are not paying the full cost of their risk.
Florida provides an example of the cross-subsidy created by assessments. Should a deficit occur, first, only Citizens policyholders are assessed. In this sense, those at risk are paying for it, only this is partially funded in up-front premiums and partially funded through an ex post assessment. Of course, a homeowner who drops the policy immediately after a hurricane will not have paid the full cost of coverage. If this first assessment is insufficient, Citizens assesses policyholders outside the program and in all other lines of coverage-excluding only medical malpractice, workers compensation, and accident and health. Citizens thus shifts the cost of catastrophe insurance from homeowners in high-risk areas to all policyholders-not just homeowners policyholders-throughout the state. In this way, residents, businesses, and nonprofits throughout Florida are subsidizing those in the highest-risk areas. In other states, assessments may be more limited. In Mississippi, for example, they are limited to property insurance premiums 11 but still introduce a cross-subsidy among policyholders in the state.
Available Contracts
The coverage limits and deductibles offered by residual market mechanisms vary widely among states (see Table 1 ). California will offer coverage up to the amount on the policyholder's homeowners policy. Among those with specific limits, Florida and Georgia offer the highest residential coverage, at $2 million. Others have tighter limits, such as Alabama, at $500,000.
Most programs have a mandatory catastrophe deductible but also offer higher deductible options for lower prices, the highest of which is a 20 percent deductible, offered in Mississippi.
The higher the coverage and the lower the deductible, the greater the exposure the program faces. Florida Citizens is the state program most often discussed as being financially unsound. It may not be surprising, then, that it offers a high coverage level and a fairly low deductible. Note that Georgia has a high coverage level as well, however, highlighting that financial soundness is about not just the contracts offered but also how they are priced, and as discussed earlier, Florida had been underpricing its policies. High levels of coverage and low deductibles can also discourage policyholders from returning to the voluntary market. In addition, the coverage limits offered by a program can have distributional implications. Higherincome homeowners may be able to afford private insurance, and private companies often offer coverage in excess of the state cap that high-income households could afford. High coverage levels, then, may be providing lower-cost insurance to those who could afford private policies.
11 State insurance programs are not the only state policies that shift costs of catastrophe risk among residents. All states have guarantee associations-state programs that pay the claims of insolvent insurers. These funds provide protection for consumers but eliminate market pressure from a homeowner choosing to place her policy with a wellcapitalized company. This can create perverse incentives. Hard hit by the 2004 storms, Poe insurance companies in Florida increased their exposure, betting that there would not be more losses in 2005, which of course turned out to be a bad bet, and Poe companies became insolvent. Grace and Klein (2009) note that solvency funds create the incentive to be overly risky in this manner, since the firm wins if the bet pays off but the state bears the cost if they are wrong. When companies do go bankrupt, all taxpayers bear that burden. 
Interaction with the Private Market
A residual market mechanism can involve private insurers in two ways, which Klein Some state programs using the assessment model structure their assessments to incentivize insurance companies to increase their exposure in high-risk areas. For instance, in North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, companies can lower their assessments by writing more policies in coastal counties. In North Carolina, however, there is some concern that larger companies have expanded their coastal coverage and limited their assessments, which will put more assessment burden on smaller insurers that might not be able to handle them in the case of a large storm (Marlett 2009 ). In Texas, companies can reduce their share of assessments by only 80 percent, so some amount of the assessments will always be spread over all companies 
Can They Handle a Catastrophe?
All of the state programs cover losses through some combination of premium revenue, surplus and investment income, reinsurance purchased, the issuance of bonds, and ex post assessments. Despite similar sources of revenue, the programs have made differing choices regarding their exposure and the level of catastrophe they aim to cover.
It appears that the Gulf Coast states with a greater degree of coastal exposure relative to the rest of the state face greater financial difficulties. For example, a majority of insured property in Florida is located in coastal counties, and in 2005, Citizens had 17 percent of the state's property insurance market; contrast this with Louisiana, whose program is 8.6 percent of the market, or Texas, at 1.6 percent (Hartwig and Wilkinson 2007) . Although Texas has significant coastal exposure to hurricanes, the state is so large that the policies for coastal residents are only a small fraction of the total market. This is not the entire story, however, as Florida Citizens'
share of the state market was only 2 percent in 2001 (Hartwig and Wilkinson 2007) .
Aggressively lowering prices, expanding coverage, and loosening eligibility standards led to growth in its market share. A large coastal population could partially explain these actions, at least indirectly. The high cost of insurance is a hot political issue in Florida and with a greater percentage of residents on the coast, elected officials may see benefits to offering subsidized policies. In states where the coastal population is a small share of the state, such redistribution may be less politically appealing.
Most of the wind pools ensure financial stability through the cross-subsidization inherent in the assessment structure. For states with larger lower-risk areas, insurance companies might be in a better position to handle assessments. For instance, in Texas, Hurricane Ike wiped out all of TWIA's reserves and required industry assessments that exceeded $500 million. Assessments in Texas, though, can be spread over a wider base of unaffected policyholders, and insurance companies have a smaller percentage of their total state portfolio exposed, suggesting they may be in a better position to handle them.
Regardless, some state programs are in a much better position to weather a severe storm than others. Florida has been in particularly bad shape. Not only is Citizens the largest insurer in the state, but most of its exposure is in high-risk coastal areas. In 2010, 56 percent of wind-only policies-in-force were in Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, and Monroe counties-all southern, coastal counties most exposed to hurricane risk. Citizens, by statute, is supposed to make its "best efforts" to procure reinsurance at "reasonable rates" to cover a 1-in-100-year loss. 13 But it has been analyzed as being able to handle only a 1-in-25-year event (Frank 2010) . This is the lowest claims-paying ability of all the states, but Citizens appears to be slowly reversing course by starting to raise rates.
California is the state that is most prepared to cover truly catastrophic loss years. This is because of its higher prices, higher deductibles, greater purchases of reinsurance, and limited geographic coverage. In 2010, it was estimated that the CEA would have claims exceeding its ability to pay only once in 545 years (Pomeroy 2010) . This is a dramatic contrast to Florida, which has chosen to offer cheaper insurance and more expansive coverage and is thus gambling with its ability to offer full and timely payments when the next large storm hits. The bill has attracted the attention of catastrophe-prone states beyond Florida. The CEO of the CEA testified in support of the House bill, arguing that it would allow the CEA to lower rates and deductibles and thereby increase take-up rates (Pomeroy 2010) . The CEA has historically spent 40 percent on average of its revenue on reinsurance, and the CEO believes this was highly profitable for the reinsurance companies while imposing costs on policyholders (Pomeroy 2010 Program. This would ultimately push more of the costs of natural disasters onto the general
taxpayer.
An alternative proposal that has been suggested many times is federal reinsurance for either private insurers or state programs. Lewis and Murdoch suggest federal excess-of-loss contracts to insurers (or state programs) to cover the catastrophic layers where there is currently little reinsurance (Lewis and Murdock 1996) . Similarly, Litan (2006) proposes a prefunded reinsurance program administered by a quasi-independent group in the Treasury Department.
Premiums would be risk based and could be reduced if the entity adopted risk reduction measures. Such programs would take advantage of the government's ability to diversify intertemporally and across the United States (private reinsurance, it should be noted, diversifies internationally) and could have industry-wide triggers (and some equivalent for state programs)
to minimize moral hazard. Cutler and Zeckhauser note that federal reinsurance could allow private market functioning for smaller losses, internalize some loss costs that the government has control over, and raise revenues for a service the government may provide anyway (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999) . Critics, however, note that governments face enormous political pressure to lower rates, as can be seen in the flood program, raising concerns that such a program would crowd out private insurance and lead to inefficient levels of mitigation (Harrington and Niehaus 2001) .
14 There seems to be little economic justification for federal intervention in the catastrophe insurance market, and moral hazard is a nontrivial concern. Losses from natural disasters are a function of where and how we build, and when such losses are passed on to others, inefficient decisions will be made. Some federal proposals have tried to address this by coupling federal aid with mitigation requirements. Ultimately, political pressure for lower catastrophe insurance premiums will demand that some costs be borne by those in low-risk areas. That is a tradeoff that will be made in the political arena. If federal intervention can put minimal burdens on the general taxpayer, or could be seen to generate revenue for aid that would have been provided anyway, those in catastrophe-prone states will presumably have an easier time garnering support for a federal program.
Conclusion
This paper has focused on one of the panoply of catastrophic risk management programs in the private and public sector-state programs that write natural catastrophe insurance. These programs were established in response to catastrophes that led private insurance companies to reduce their exposure and raise their rates. Such programs can ensure availability of catastrophe insurance and provide it more cheaply, but to do so, they pass some costs off on other policyholders or taxpayers in the state. It is inescapable that insuring catastrophic risks is expensive.
This raises the question of whether cheaper, more available catastrophe insurance for low-income, high-risk areas provides a public good or is something every homeowner should have access to, no matter where he locates or how she builds. If we, as society, support either proposition, then state programs that offer broad coverage and spread the costs are one mechanism to achieve our goals. If, however, we believe that those who assume higher risks should bear the costs, either for equity or economic efficiency, the design of many state programs falls short. This is not an either-or question; programs must locate themselves on a spectrum balancing affordability, cross-subsidies, and claims-paying ability.
An interesting proposition that has been suggested but is not explored here is that the composition of the boards of directors and other organizational structures of residual market mechanisms influence whether they adopt design choices that truly make the program an insurer of last resort. Boards composed largely of national insurance company representatives may push harder to make the residual market coverage unattractive, whereas when coastal residents make up the board, they will push to have lower rates, expanded coverage, and cross-subsidies to coastal areas. This is a topic worthy of further research. program to support state programs and/or the private market is going to require candidly and carefully asking ourselves who should pay for catastrophe risks, how we believe exposure should change in the coming decades, and how government and institutional structures can help us achieve our risk management goals without introducing perverse incentives and unintended sideeffects.
